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Abstract
We consider the two-fold problem of rep-
resenting collective beliefs and aggregating
these beliefs. We propose modular, transitive
relations for collective beliefs. They allow
us to represent conflicting opinions and they
have a clear semantics. We compare them
with the quasi-transitive relations often used
in Social Choice. Then, we describe a way
to construct the belief state of an agent in-
formed by a set of sources of varying degrees
of reliability. This construction circumvents
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem in a satisfac-
tory manner. Finally, we give a simple set-
theory-based operator for combining the in-
formation of multiple agents. We show that
this operator satisfies the desirable invariants
of idempotence, commutativity, and associa-
tivity, and, thus, is well-behaved when iter-
ated, and we describe a computationally ef-
fective way of computing the resulting belief
state.
Keywords: representation of beliefs, multi-agent sys-
tems
1 Introduction
We are interested in the multi-agent setting where
agents are informed by sources of varying levels of reli-
ability, and where agents can iteratively combine their
belief states. This setting introduces three problems:
(1) Finding an appropriate representation for collec-
tive beliefs; (2) Constructing an agent’s belief state by
aggregating the information from informant sources,
accounting for the relative reliability of these sources;
and, (3) Combining the information of multiple agents
in a manner that is well-behaved under iteration.
The Social Choice community has dealt extensively
with the first problem (although in the context of
representing collective preferences rather than beliefs)
(cf. (Sen 1986)). The classical approach has been to
use quasi-transitive relations (of which total pre-orders
are a special subclass) over the set of possible worlds.
However, these relations do not distinguish between
group indifference and group conflict, and this distinc-
tion can be crucial. Consider, for example, a situa-
tion in which all members of a group are indifferent
between movie a and movie b. If some passerby ex-
presses a preference for a, the group may very well
choose to adopt this opinion for the group and borrow
a. However, if the group was already divided over the
relative merits of a and b, we would be wise to hesitate
before choosing one over the other just because a new
supporter of a appears on the scene. We propose a
representation in which the distinction is explicit. We
also argue that our representation solves some of the
unpleasant semantical problems suffered by the earlier
approach.
The second problem addresses how an agent should
actually go about combining the information received
from a set of sources to create a belief state. Such a
mechanism should favor the opinions held by more re-
liable sources, yet allow less reliable sources to voice
opinions when higher ranked sources have no opin-
ion. True, under some circumstances it would not
be advisable for an opinion from a less reliable source
to override the agnosticism of a more reliable source,
but often it is better to accept these opinions as de-
fault assumptions until better information is available.
(Maynard-Reid II and Shoham 2000) provides a solu-
tion to this problem when belief states are represented
as total pre-orders, but runs into Arrow’s Impossibil-
ity Theorem (Arrow 1963) when there are sources of
equal reliability. As we shall see, the generalized rep-
resentation allows us to circumvent this limitation.
To motivate the third problem, consider the follow-
ing dynamic scenario: A robot controlling a ship in
space receives from a number of communication cen-
ters on Earth information about the status of its en-
vironment and tasks. Each center receives informa-
tion from a group of sources of varying credibility or
accuracy (e.g., nearby satellites and experts) and ag-
gregates it. Timeliness of decision-making in space is
often crucial, so we do not want the robot to have to
wait while each center sends its information to some
central location for it to be first combined before be-
ing forwarded to the robot. Instead, each center sends
its aggregated information directly to the robot. Not
only does this scheme reduce dead time, it also allows
for “anytime” behavior on the robot’s part: the robot
incorporates new information as it arrives and makes
the best decisions it can with whatever information it
has at any given point. This distributed approach is
also more robust since the degradation in performance
is much more graceful should information from indi-
vidual centers get lost or delayed.
In such a scenario, the robot needs a mechanism for
combining or fusing the belief states of multiple agents
potentially arriving at different times. Moreover, the
belief state output by the mechanism should be invari-
ant with respect to the order of agent arrivals. We will
describe such a mechanism.
The paper is organized as follows: After some pre-
liminary definitions and a discussion of the approach
to aggregation taken in classical Social Choice, we in-
troduce modular, transitive relations for representing
generalized belief states. We then describe how to
construct the belief state of an agent given the be-
lief states of its informant sources when these sources
are totally pre-ordered. Finally, we describe a simple
set-theory-based operator for fusing agent belief states
that satisfies the desirable invariants of idempotence,
commutativity, and associativity, and we describe a
computationally effective way of computing this belief
state.
2 Preliminaries
We begin by defining various well-known properties of
binary relations1; they will be useful to us throughout
the paper.
Definition 1 Suppose ≤ is a relation over a finite
set Ω, i.e., ≤⊆ Ω× Ω. We shall use x ≤ y to denote
(x, y) ∈≤ and x 6≤ y to denote (x, y) 6∈≤. The relation
≤ is:
1We only use binary relations in this paper, so we will
refer to them simply as relations.
1. reflexive iff x ≤ x for x ∈ Ω. It is irreflexive iff
x 6≤ x for x ∈ Ω.
2. symmetric iff x ≤ y ⇒ y ≤ x for x, y ∈ Ω. It is
asymmetric iff x ≤ y ⇒ y 6≤ x for x, y ∈ Ω. It
is anti-symmetric iff x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ x⇒ x = y for
x, y ∈ Ω.
3. the strict version of a relation ≤′ over Ω iff
x ≤ y ⇔ x ≤′ y ∧ y 6≤′ x for x, y ∈ Ω.
4. total iff x ≤ y ∨ y ≤ x for x, y ∈ Ω.
5. modular iff x ≤ y ⇒ x ≤ z ∨ z ≤ y for x, y, z ∈ Ω.
6. transitive iff x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ z ⇒ x ≤ z for
x, y, z ∈ Ω.
7. quasi-transitive iff its strict version is transitive.
8. the transitive closure of a relation ≤′
over Ω iff x ≤ y ⇔ ∃w0, . . . , wn ∈ Ω.
x = w0 ≤′ · · · ≤′ wn = y for some integer n,
for x, y ∈ Ω.
9. acyclic iff ∀w0, . . . , wn ∈ Ω. w0 < · · · < wn im-
plies wn 6< w0 for all integers n, where < is the
strict version of ≤.
10. a total pre-order iff it is total and transitive. It is
a total order iff it is also anti-symmetric.
11. an equivalence relation iff it is reflexive, symmet-
ric, and transitive.
Proposition 1
1. The transitive closure of a modular relation is
modular.
2. Every transitive relation is quasi-transitive.
3. (Sen 1986) Every quasi-transitive relation is
acyclic.
Given a relation over a set of alternatives and a subset
of these alternatives, we often want to pick the subset’s
“best” elements with respect to the relation. We define
this set of “best” elements to be the subset’s choice set:
Definition 2 If ≤ is a relation over a finite set Ω, <
is its strict version, and X ⊆ Ω, then the choice set of
X with respect to ≤ is
C(X,≤) = {x ∈ X : 6 ∃x′ ∈ X. x′ < x}.
A choice function is one which assigns to every subset
X a non-empty subset of X :
Definition 3 A choice function over a finite set Ω is
a function f : 2Ω \ ∅ → 2Ω \ ∅ such that f(X) ⊆ X for
every X ⊆ Ω.
Now, every acyclic relation defines a choice function,
one which assigns to each subset its choice set:
Proposition 2 (Sen 1986) Given a relation ≤ over a
finite set Ω, the choice set operation C defines a choice
function iff ≤ is acyclic.2
If a relation is not acyclic, elements involved in a cycle
are said to be in a conflict because we cannot order
them:
Definition 4 Given a relation < over a finite
set Ω, x and y are in a conflict wrt < iff
there exist w0, . . . , wn, z0, . . . , zm ∈ Ω such that
x = w0 < · · · < wn = y = z0 < · · · < zm = x, where
x, y ∈ Ω.
3 Aggregation in Social Choice
We are interested in belief aggregation, but the com-
munity historically most interested in aggregation has
been that of Social Choice theory. The aggregation is
over preferences rather than beliefs, so the discussion
in this subsection will focus on representing prefer-
ences; however, as we shall see, the results are equally
relevant to representing beliefs. In the Social Choice
community, the standard representation of an agent’s
preferences is a total pre-order. Each total pre-order
i is interpreted as describing the weak preferences of
an individual i, so that x i y means i considers al-
ternative x to be at least as preferable as alternative
y.3 If x i y and y i x, then i is indifferent between
x and y.
Unfortunately, Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (Arrow
1963) showed that no aggregation operator over total
pre-orders exists satisfying the following small set of
desirable properties:
Definition 5 Let f be an aggregation operator over
the preferences 1, . . . , n of n individuals, respec-
tively, over a finite set of alternatives Ω, and let
 = f(1, . . . ,n).
• Restricted Range: The range of f is the set of
total pre-orders over Ω.
2Sen’s uses a slightly stronger definition of choice sets,
but the theorem still holds in our more general case.
3The direction of the relation symbol is unintuitive, but
standard practice in the belief revision community.
• Unrestricted Domain: The domain of f is the set
of n-tuples of total pre-orders over Ω.
• Pareto Principle: If x ≺i y for all i, then x ≺ y.
• Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA):
Suppose ′ = f(′1, . . . ,
′
n). If, for x, y ∈ Ω,
x i y iff x 
′
i y for all i, then x  y iff x 
′ y.
• Non-Dictatorship: There is no individual i such
that, for every tuple in the domain of f and every
x, y ∈ Ω, x ≺i y implies x ≺ y.
Proposition 3 (Arrow 1963) There is no aggregation
operator that satisfies restricted range, unrestricted do-
main, (weak) Pareto principle, independendence of ir-
relevant alternatives, and nondictatorship.
This impossibility theorem led researchers to look for
weakenings to Arrow’s framework that would circum-
vent the result. One was to weaken the restricted range
condition, requiring that the result of an aggregation
only satisfy totality and quasi-transitivity rather than
the full transitivity of a total pre-order. This weak-
ening was sufficient to guarantee the existence of an
aggregation function satisfying the other conditions,
while still producing relations that defined choice func-
tions (Sen 1986). However, this solution was not with-
out its own problems.
First, total, quasi-transitive relations have unsatisfac-
tory semantics. If  is total and quasi-transitive but
not a total pre-order, its indifference relation is not
transitive:
Proposition 4 Let  be a relation over a finite set
Ω and let ∼ be its symmetric restriction (i.e., x ∼ y
iff x  y and y  x). If  is total and quasi-transitive
but not transitive, then ∼ is not transitive.
There has been much discussion as to whether or not
indifference should be transitive; in many cases one
feels indifference should be transitive. If Deb enjoys
plums and mangoes equally and also enjoys mangoes
and peaches equally, we would conclude that she also
enjoys plums and peaches equally. It seems that total
quasi-transitive relations that are not total pre-orders
cannot be understood easily as preference or indiffer-
ence.
Since the existence of a choice function is generally suf-
ficient for classical Social Choice problems, this issue
was at least ignorable. However, in iterated aggrega-
tion, the result of the aggregation must not only be us-
able for making decisions, but must be interpretable as
a new preference relation that may be involved in later
aggregations; consequently, it must maintain clean se-
mantics.
Secondly, the totality assumption is excessively restric-
tive for representing aggregate preferences. In general,
a binary relation  can express four possible relation-
ships between a pair of alternatives a and b: a  b and
b 6 a, b  a and a 6 b, a  b and b  a, and a 6 b
and b 6 a. Totality reduces this set to the first three
which, under the interpretation of relations as repre-
senting weak preference, correspond to the two strict
orderings of a and b, and indifference. However, con-
sider the situation where a couple is trying to choose
between an Italian and an Indian restaurant, but one
strictly prefers Italian food to Indian food, whereas the
second strictly prefers Indian to Italian. The couple’s
opinions are in conflict, a situation that does not fit
into any of the three remaining categories. Thus, the
totality assumption is essentially an assumption that
conflicts do not exist. This, one may argue, is appro-
priate if we want to represent preferences of one agent
(but see (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) for persua-
sive arguments that individuals are often ambivalent).
However, the assumption is inappropriate if we want to
represent aggregate preferences since individuals will
almost certainly have differences of opinion.
4 Generalized Belief States
Let us turn to the domain of belief aggregation. A
total pre-order over the set of possible worlds is a
fairly well-accepted representation for a belief state in
the belief revision community (Grove 1988; Katsuno
and Mendelzon 1991; Lehmann and Magidor 1992;
Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson 1994). Instead of prefer-
ence, relations represent relative likelihood, instead of
indifference, equal likelihood. For the remainder of the
paper, assume we are given some language L with a
satisfaction relation |= for L. Let W be a finite, non-
empty set of possible worlds (interpretations) over L.
Suppose  is a total pre-order on W . The belief re-
vision literature maintains that the conditional belief
“if p then q” (where p and q are sentences in L) holds
if all the worlds in the choice set of those satisfying p
also satisfy q; we write Bel(p?q). The individual’s un-
conditional beliefs are all those where p is the sentence
true. If neither the belief p?q nor its negation hold in
the belief state, it is said to be agnostic with respect
to p?q, written Agn(p?q).
It should come as no surprise that belief aggregation
is formally similar to preference aggregation and, as a
result, is also susceptible to the problems described in
the previous section. We propose a solution to these
problems which generalizes the total pre-order repre-
sentation so as to capture information about conflicts.
4.1 Modular, transitive states
We take strict likelihood as primitive. Since strict like-
lihood is not necessarily total, it is possible to repre-
sent agnosticism and conflicting opinions in the same
structure. This choice deviates from that of most au-
thors, but are similar to those of Kreps (Kreps 1990,
p. 19) who is interested in representing both indiffer-
ence and incomparability. Unlike Kreps, rather than
use an asymmetric relation to represent strict likeli-
hood (e.g., the strict version of a weak likelihood rela-
tion), we impose the less restrictive condition of mod-
ularity.
We formally define generalized belief states:
Definition 6 A generalized belief state ≺ is a mod-
ular, transitive relation over W. The set of possible
generalized belief states over W is denoted B.
We interpret a ≺ b to mean “there is reason to con-
sider a as strictly more likely than b.” We represent
equal likelihood, which we also refer to as “agnosti-
cism,” with the relationship ∼ defined such that x ∼ y
if and only if x 6≺ y and y 6≺ x. We define the conflict
relation corresponding to ≺, denoted ∞, so that x∞y
iff x ≺ y and y ≺ x. It describes situations where there
are reasons to consider either of a pair of worlds as
strictly more likely than the other. In fact, one can
easily check that ∞ precisely represents conflicts in a
belief state in the sense of Definition 4.
For convenience, we will refer to generalized belief
states simply as belief states for the remainder of the
paper except when to do so would cause confusion.
4.2 Discussion
Let us consider why our choice of representation is
justified. First, we agree with the Social Choice com-
munity that strict likelihood should be transitive.
As we discussed in the previous section, there is of-
ten no compelling reason why agnosticism/indifference
should not be transitive; we also adopt this view.
However, transitivity of strict likelihood by itself does
not guarantee transitivity of agnosticism. A sim-
ple example is the following: ≺= {(a, c)}, so that
∼= {(a, b), (b, c)}. However, if we buy that strict like-
lihood should be transitive, then agnosticism is transi-
tive identically when strict likelihood is also modular:
Proposition 5 Suppose a relation ≺ is transitive and
∼ is the corresponding agnosticism relation. Then ∼
is transitive iff ≺ is modular.
In summary, transitivity and modularity are necessary
if strict likelihood and agnosticism are both required
to be transitive.
We should point out that conflicts are also transitive
in our framework. At first glance, this may appear
undesirable: it is entirely possible for a group to dis-
agree on the relative likelihood of worlds a and b, and
b and c, yet agree that a is more likely than c. How-
ever, we note that this transitivity follows from the
cycle-based definition of conflicts (Definition 4), not
from our belief state representation. It highlights the
fact that we are not only concerned with conflicts that
arise from simple disagreements over pairs of alterna-
tives, but those that can be inferred from a series of
inconsistent opinions as well.
Now, to argue that modular, transitive relations are
sufficient to capture relative likelihood, agnosticism,
and conflicts among a group of information sources,
we first point out that adding irreflexivity would give
us the class of relations that are strict versions of total
pre-orders, i.e., conflict-free. Let T be the set of total
pre-orders over W , T<, the set of their strict versions.
Proposition 6 The set of irreflexive relations in B is
isomorphic to T and, in fact, equals T<.
Secondly, the following representation theorem shows
that each belief state partitions the possible worlds
into sets of worlds either all equally likely or all poten-
tially involved in a conflict, and totally orders these
sets; worlds in distinct sets have the same relation to
each other as do the sets.
Proposition 7 ≺∈ B iff there is a partition
W = 〈W0, . . . ,Wn〉 of W such that:
1. For every x ∈Wi and y ∈Wj , i 6= j implies i < j
iff x ≺ y.
2. Every Wi is either fully connected (w ≺ w′ for all
w,w′ ∈Wi) or fully disconnected (w 6≺ w′ for all
w,w′ ∈Wi).
Figure 1 shows three examples of belief states: one
which is a total pre-order, one which is the strict ver-
sion of a total pre-order, and one which is neither.
Thus, generalized belief states are not a big change
from the strict versions of total pre-orders. They
merely generalize these by weakening the assumption
that sets of worlds not strictly ordered are equally
likely, allowing for the possibility of conflicts. Now
we can distinguish between agnostic and conflicting
conditional beliefs. A belief state ≺ is agnostic about
(c)
P P P
P P
(b)(a)
P
Figure 1: Three examples of generalized belief states:
(a) a total pre-order, (b) the strict version of a total
pre-order, (c) neither. (Each circle represents all the
worlds in W which satisfy the sentence inside. An arc
between circles indicates that w ≺ w′ for every w in
the head circle and w′ in the tail circle; no arc indi-
cates that w 6≺ w′ for each of these pairs. In particular,
the set of worlds represented by a circle is fully con-
nected if there is an arc from the circle to itself, fully
disconnected otherwise.)
conditional belief p?q (i.e., Agn(p?q)) if the choice set
of worlds satisfying p contains both worlds which sat-
isfy q and ¬q and is fully disconnected. It is in conflict
about this belief, written Con(p?q), if the choice set is
fully connected.
Finally, we compare the representational power of our
definitions to those discussed in the previous section.
First, B subsumes the class of total pre-orders:
Proposition 8 T ⊂ B and is the set of reflexive rela-
tions in B.
Secondly, B neither subsumes nor is subsumed by the
set of total, quasi-transitive relations, and the inter-
section of the two classes is T . Let Q be the set of
total, quasi-transitive relations over W , and Q<, the
set of their strict versions.
Proposition 9
1. Q∩ B = T .
2. B 6⊆ Q.
3. Q 6⊆ B if W has at least three elements.
4. Q ⊂ B if W has one or two elements.
Because modular, transitive relations represent strict
preferences, it is probably fairer to compare them to
the class of strict versions of total, quasi-transitive re-
lations. Again, neither class subsumes the other, but
this time the intersection is T<:
Proposition 10
1. Q< ∩ B = T<.
2. B 6⊆ Q<.
3. Q< 6⊆ B if W has at least three elements.
4. Q< ⊂ B if W has one or two elements.
In the next section, we define a natural aggregation
policy based on this new representation that admits
clear semantics and obeys appropriately modified ver-
sions of Arrow’s conditions.
5 Single-agent belief state
construction
Suppose an agent is informed by a set of sources, each
with its individual belief state. Suppose further that
the agent has ranked the sources by level of credibility.
We propose an operator for constructing the agent’s
belief state ≺ by aggregating the belief states of the
sources in S while accounting for the credibility rank-
ing of the sources.
Example 1 We will use a running example from our
space robot domain to help provide intuition for our
definitions. The robot sends to earth a stream of
telemetry data gathered by the spacecraft, as long as
it receives positive feedback that the data is being re-
ceived. At some point it loses contact with the auto-
matic feedback system, so it sends a request for infor-
mation to an agent on earth to find out if the failure
was caused by a failure of the feedback system or by an
overload of the data retrieval system. In the former
case, it would continue to send data, in the latter, de-
sist. As it so happens, there has been no overload, but
the computer running the feedback system has hung.
The agent consults the following three experts, aggre-
gates their beliefs, and sends the results back to the
robot:
1. sp, the computer programmer that developed the
feedback program, believes nothing could ever go
wrong with her code, so there must have been an
overload problem. However, she admits that if
her program had crashed, the problem could rip-
ple through to cause an overload.
2. sm, the manager for the telemetry division, unfor-
tunately has out-dated information that the feed-
back system is working. She was also told by the
engineer who sold her the system that overloading
could never happen. She has no idea what would
happen if there was an overload or the feedback
system crashed.
3. st, the technician working on the feedback sys-
tem, knows that the feedback system crashed, but
doesn’t know whether there was a data-overload.
Not being familiar with the retrieval system, she is
also unable to speculate whether the data retrieval
system would have overloaded if the feedback sys-
tem had not failed.
Let F and D be propositional variables representing
that the feedback and data retrieval systems, respec-
tively, are okay. The belief states for the three sources
are shown in Figure 2.
t
FD
FD
FD
FD DF
FD
F
F
s ssp m
Figure 2: The belief states of sp, sm, and st in Exam-
ple 1.
Let us begin the formal development by defining
sources:
Definition 7 S is a finite set of sources. With each
source s ∈ S is associated a belief state <s∈ B.
We denote the agnosticism and conflict relations of a
source s by ≈s and ⊲⊳s, respectively. It is possible to
assume that the belief state of a source is conflict free,
i.e., acyclic. However, this is not necessary if we allow
sources to suffer from the human malady of “being
torn between possibilities.”
We assume that the agent’s credibility ranking over
the sources is a total pre-order:
Definition 8 R is a totally ordered finite set of ranks.
Definition 9 rank : S → R assigns to each source a
rank.
Definition 10 ⊒ is the total pre-order over S in-
duced by the ordering over R. That is, s ⊒ s′ iff
rank(s) ≥ rank(s′); we say s′ is as credible as s. ⊒S
is the restriction of ⊒ to S ⊆ S.
We use ❂ and ≡ to denote the asymmetric and sym-
metric restrictions of ⊒, respectively.4 The finiteness
of S (R) ensures that a maximal source (rank) al-
ways exists, which is necessary for some of our results.
Weaker assumptions are possible, but at the price of
unnecessarily complicating the discussion.
We are ready to consider the source aggregation prob-
lem. In the following, assume an agent is informed by
a set of sources S ⊆ S. We look at two special cases—
equal-ranked and strictly-ranked source aggregation—
before considering the general case.
5.1 Equal-ranked sources aggregation
Suppose all the sources have the same rank so that
⊒S is fully connected. Intuitively, we want take all
offered opinions seriously, so we take the union of the
relations:
Definition 11 If S ⊆ S, then Un(S) is the relation⋃
s∈S <
s.
By simply taking the union of the source belief states,
we may lose transitivity. However, we do not lose mod-
ularity:
Proposition 11 If S ⊆ S, then Un(S) is modular but
not necessarily transitive.
Thus, we know from Proposition 1 that we need only
take the transitive closure of Un(S) to get a belief
state:
Definition 12 If S ⊆ S, then AGRUn(S) is the re-
lation Un(S)+.
Proposition 12 If S ⊆ S, then AGRUn(S) ∈ B.
Not surprisingly, by taking all opinions of all sources
seriously, we may generate many conflicts, manifested
as fully connected subsets of W .
Example 2 Suppose all three sources in the space
robot scenario of Example 1 are considered equally
credible, then the aggregate belief state will be the fully
connected relation indicating that there are conflicts
over every belief.
5.2 Strictly-ranked sources aggregation
Next, consider the case where the sources are strictly
ranked, i.e., ⊒S is a total order. We define an operator
4Note that, unlike the relations representing belief
states, ≥ and ⊒ are read in the intuitive way, that is,
“greater” corresponds to “better.”
such that lower-ranked sources refine the belief states
of higher ranked sources. That is, in determining the
ordering of a pair of worlds, the opinions of higher-
ranked sources generally override those of lower-ranked
sources, and lower-ranked sources are consulted when
higher-ranked sources are agnostic:
Definition 13 If S ⊆ S, then AGRRf(S) is the re-
lation{
(x, y) : ∃s ∈ S. x <s y ∧
(
∀s′ ❂ s ∈ S. x ≈s
′
y
)}
.
The definition of the AGRRf operator does not rely
on ⊒S being a total order, and we will use it in this
more general setting in the following sub-section. How-
ever, in the case that ⊒S is a total order, the result of
applying AGRRf is guaranteed to be a belief state.
Proposition 13 If S ⊆ S and ⊒S is a total order,
then AGRRf(S) ∈ B.
Example 3 Suppose, in the space robot scenario of
Example 1, the technician is considered more cred-
ible than the manager who, in turn, is considered
more credible than the programmer. The aggregate be-
lief state, shown in Figure 3, informs the robot cor-
rectly that the feedback system has crashed, but that it
shouldn’t worry about an overload problem and should
keep sending data.
FD
FD
FD
FD
Figure 3: The belief state after aggregation in Exam-
ple 3 when st ❂ sm ❂ sp.
Note that this case of strictly-ranked sources is al-
most exactly that considered in (Maynard-Reid II and
Shoham 2000), except that the authors are not able to
allow for conflicts in belief states. A surprising result
they show is that standard AGM belief revision (Al-
chourro´n et al. 1985) can be modeled as the aggrega-
tion of two sources, the informant and the informee,
where the informant is considered more credible than
the informee.
5.3 General aggregation
In the general case, we may have several ranks rep-
resented and multiple sources of each rank. It will
be instructive to first consider the following seem-
ingly natural strawman operator, AGR∗: First com-
bine equi-rank sources using AGRUn, then aggregate
the strictly-ranked results using what is essentially
AGRRf :
Definition 14 Let S ⊆ S. For any r ∈ R,
let <r= AGRUn({s ∈ S : rank(s) = r}) and ≈r′ ,
the corresponding agnosticism relation. Also, let
rank(S) = {r ∈ R : ∃s ∈ S. rank(s) = r}. AGR∗(S)
is the relation{
(x, y) :
∃r ∈ R. x <r y∧
(∀r′ > r ∈ ranks(S). x ≈r′ y)
}
AGR∗ indeed defines a legitimate belief state:
Proposition 14 If S ⊆ S, then AGR∗(S) ∈ B.
Unfortunately, a problem with this “divide-and-
conquer” approach is it assumes the result of ag-
gregation is independent of potential interactions be-
tween the individual sources of different ranks. Con-
sequently, opinions that will eventually get overridden
may still have an indirect effect on the final aggrega-
tion result by introducing superfluous opinions during
the intermediate equi-rank aggregation step, as the fol-
lowing example shows:
Example 4 Let W = {a, b, c}. Suppose S ⊆ S
such that S = {s0, s1, s2} with belief states
<s0= {(b, a), (b, c)} and <s1=<s2= {(a, b), (c, b)},
and where s2 ❂ s1 ≡ s0. Then AGR∗(S) is
{(a, b), (c, b), (a, c), (c, a), (a, a), (b, b), (c, c)}. All
sources are agnostic over a and c, yet (a, c) and (c, a)
are in the result because of the transitive closure in
the lower rank involving opinions ((b, c) and (b, a))
which actually get overridden in the final result.
Because of these undesired effects, we propose another
aggregation operator which circumvents this problem
by applying refinement (as defined in Definition 13)
to the set of source belief states before infering new
opinions via closure:
Definition 15 The rank-based aggregation of a set of
sources S ⊆ S is AGR(S) = AGRRf(S)+.
Encouragingly, AGR outputs a valid belief state:
Proposition 15 If S ⊆ S, then AGR(S) ∈ B.
Example 5 Suppose, in the space robot scenario of
Example 1, the technician is still considered more cred-
ible than the manager and the programmer, but the
latter two are considered equally credible. The aggre-
gate belief state, shown in Figure 5, still gives the robot
the correct information about the state of the system.
The robot also learns for future reference that there
is some disagreement over whether or not there would
have been a data overload if the feedback system were
working.
F
FD
FD
Figure 4: The belief state after aggregation in Exam-
ple 5 when st ❂ sm ≡ sp.
We observe that AGR, when applied to the set of
sources in Example 4, does indeed bypass the problem
described above of extraneous opinion introduction:
Example 6 Assume W, S, and ⊒ are as in Exam-
ple 4. AGR(S) = {(a, b), (c, b)}.
We also observe that AGR behaves well in the special
cases we’ve considered, reducing to AGRUn when all
sources have equal rank, and to AGRRf when the
sources are totally ranked:
Proposition 16 Suppose S ⊆ S.
1. If ⊒S is fully connected, AGR(S) = AGRUn(S).
2. If ⊒S is a total order, AGR(S) = AGRRf(S).
5.4 Arrow, revisited
Finally, a strong argument in favor of AGR is that
it satisfies appropriate modifications of Arrow’s condi-
tions. Let f be an operator which aggregates the belief
states<s1 , . . . , <sn overW of n sources s1, . . . , sn ∈ S,
respectively, and let ≺ = f(<s1 , . . . , <sn). We con-
sider each condition separately.
Restricted range The output of the aggregation
function will be a modular, transitive belief state
rather than a total pre-order.
Definition 16 (modified) Restricted Range: The
range of f is B.
Unrestricted domain Similarly, the input to the
aggregation function will be modular, transitive belief
states of sources rather than total pre-orders.
Definition 17 (modified) Unrestricted Domain: For
each i, <si can be any member of B.
Pareto principle Generalized belief states already
represent strict likelihood. Consequently, we use the
actual input and output relations of the aggregation
function in place of their strict versions to define the
Pareto principle. Obviously, because we allow for the
introduction of conflicts, AGR will not satisfy the orig-
inal formal Pareto principle which essentially states
that if all sources have an unconflicted belief that one
world is strictly more likely than another, this must
also be true of the aggregated belief state. Neither
condition is necessarily stronger than the other.
Definition 18 (modified) Pareto Principle: If
x <si y for all i, then x ≺ y.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives Con-
flicts are defined in terms of cycles, not necessarily
binary. By allowing the existence of conflicts, we ef-
fectively have made it possible for outside worlds to
affect the relation between a pair of worlds, viz., by
involving them in a cycle. As a result, we need to
weaken IIA to say that the relation between worlds
should be independent of other worlds unless these
other worlds put them in conflict.
Definition 19 (modified) Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives (IIA): Suppose s′1, . . . , s
′
n ∈ S such that
si ≡ s′i for all i, and ≺
′= f(<s
′
1 , . . . , <s
′
n). If, for
x, y ∈ W, x <si y iff x <s
′
i y for all i, x6∞y, and x6∞′y,
then x ≺ y iff x ≺′ y.
Non-dictatorship As with the Pareto principle def-
inition, we use the actual input and output relations
to define non-dictatorship since belief states repre-
sent strict likelihood. From this perspective, our set-
ting requires that informant sources of the highest
rank be “dictators” in the sense considered by Ar-
row. However, the setting originally considered by Ar-
row was one where all individuals are ranked equally.
Thus, we make this explicit in our new definition of
non-dictatorship by adding the pre-condition that all
sources be of equal rank. Now, AGR treats a set of
equi-rank sources equally by taking all their opinions
seriously, at the price of introducing conflicts. So, in-
tuitively, there are no dictators. However, because Ar-
row did not account for conflicts in his formulation, all
the sources will be “dictators” by his definition. We
need to modify the definition of non-dictatorship to
say that no source can always push opinions through
without them ever being contested.
Definition 20 (modified) Non-Dictatorship: If
si ≡ sj for all i, j, then there is no i such that, for
every combination of source belief states and every
x, y ∈ W, x <si y and y 6<si x implies x ≺ y and
y 6≺ x.
We now show that AGR indeed satisfies these condi-
tions:
Proposition 17 Let S = {s1, . . . , sn} ⊆ S and
AGRf (<
s1 , . . . , <sn) = AGR(S). AGRf satisfies (the
modified versions of) restricted range, unrestricted
domain, Pareto principle, IIA, and non-dictatorship.
6 Multi-agent fusion
So far, we have only considered the case where a sin-
gle agent must construct or update her belief state
once informed by a set of sources. Multi-agent fu-
sion is the process of aggregating the belief states of a
set of agents, each with its respective set of informant
sources. We proceed to formalize this setting.
An agent A is informed by a set of sources S ⊆ S.
Agent A’s induced belief state is the belief state
formed by aggregating the belief states of its infor-
mant sources, i.e., AGR(S). Assume the set of agents
to fuse agree upon rank (and, consequently, ⊒).5 We
define the fusion of this set to be an agent informed
by the combination of informant sources:
Definition 21 Let A = {A1, . . . , An} be a set of
agents such that each agent Ai is informed by Si ⊆ S.
The fusion of A, written ©∨ (A), is an agent informed
by S =
⋃n
i=1 Si.
Not surprisingly given its set-theoretic definition, fu-
sion is idempotent, commutative, and associative.
These properties guarantee the invariance required in
multi-agent belief aggregation applications such as our
space robot domain.
5We could easily extend the framework to allow for indi-
vidual rankings, but we felt that the small gain in general-
ity would not justify the additional complexity and loss of
perspicuity. Similarly, we could consider each agent as hav-
ing a credibility ordering only over its informant sources.
However, it is unclear how, for example, crediblity order-
ings over disjoint sets of sources should be combined into a
new credibility ordering since their union will not be total.
In the multi-agent space robot scenario described in
Section 1, we only have a direct need for the belief
states that result from fusion. We are only interested
in the belief states of the original sources in as far as
we want the fused belief state to reflect its informant
history. An obvious question is whether it is possi-
ble to compute the belief state induced by the agents’
fusion solely from their initial belief states, that is,
without having to reference the belief states of their
informant sources. This is highly desirable because of
the expense of storing—or, as in the case of our space
robot example, transmitting—all source belief states;
we would like to represent each agent’s knowledge as
compactly as possible.
In fact, we can do this if all sources have equal rank.
We simply take the transitive closure of the union of
the agents’ belief states:
Proposition 18 Let A and S be as in Definition 21,
≺Ai , agent Ai’s induced belief state, and ⊒S, fully con-
nected. If A =©∨ (A), then
(⋃
Ai∈A
≺Ai
)+
is A’s in-
duced belief state.
Unfortunately, the equal rank case is special. If we
have sources of different ranks, we generally cannot
compute the induced belief state after fusion using
only the agent belief states before fusion, as the fol-
lowing simple example demonstrates:
Example 7 Let W = {a, b}. Suppose two agents A1
and A2 are informed by sources s1 with belief state
<s1= {(a, b)} and s2 with belief state <s2= {(b, a)},
respectively. A1’s belief state is the same as s1’s and
A2’s is the same as s2’s. If s1 ❂ s2, then the belief
state induced by ©∨ (A1, A2) is <s1 , whereas if s2 ❂ s1,
then it is <s2 . Thus, just knowing the belief states
of the fused agents is not sufficient for computing the
induced belief state. We need more information about
the original sources.
However, if sources are totally pre-ordered by credi-
bility, we can still do much better than storing all the
original sources. It is enough to store for each opinion
of AGRRf(S) the rank of the highest-ranked source
supporting it. We define pedigreed belief states which
enrich belief states with this additional information:
Definition 22 Let A be an agent informed by a set
of sources S ⊆ S. A’s pedigreed belief state is a pair
(≺, l) where ≺= AGRRf(S) and l :≺→ R such that
l((x, y)) = max{rank(s) : x <s y, s ∈ S}. We use ≺Ar
to denote the restriction of A’s pedigreed belief state
to r, that is, ≺Ar = {(x, y) ∈≺: l((x, y)) = r}.
We verify that a pair’s label is, in fact, the rank of
the source used to determine the pair’s membership in
AGRRf(S), not that of some higher-ranked source:
Proposition 19 Let A be an agent informed by a set
of sources S ⊆ S and with pedigreed belief state (≺, l).
Then
x ≺Ar y
iff
∃s ∈ S. x <s y ∧ r = rank(s)∧(
∀s′ ❂ s ∈ S. x ≈s
′
y
)
.
The belief state induced by a pedigreed belief state
(≺, l) is, obviously, the transitive closure of ≺.
Now, given only the pedigreed belief states of a set of
agents, we can compute the new pedigreed belief state
after fusion. We simply combine the labeled opinions
using our refinement techniques.
Proposition 20 Let A and S be as in Definition 21,
⊒S, a total pre-order, and A =©∨ (A). If
1. ≺ is the relation{
(x, y) :
∃Ai ∈ A, r ∈ R. x ≺
Ai
r y∧(
∀Aj ∈ A, r′ > r ∈ R. x ∼
Aj
r′ y
) }
over W,
2. l :≺→ R such that
l((x, y)) = max{r : x ≺Air y,Ai ∈ A}, and
then (≺, l) is A’s pedigreed belief state.
From the perspective of the induced belief states,
we are essentially discarding unlabeled opinions (i.e.,
those derived by the closure operation) before fusion.
Intuitively, we are learning new information so we may
need to retract some of our inferred opinions. After
fusion, we re-apply closure to complete the new be-
lief state. Interestingly, in the special case where the
sources are strictly-ranked, the closure is unnecessary:
Proposition 21 If A and S are as in Definition 21,
⊒S is a total order, and (≺, l) is the pedigreed belief
state of ©∨ (A), then ≺+=≺.
Example 8 Let’s look once more at the space robot
scenario considered in Example 1. Suppose the arro-
gant programmer is not part of the telemetry team, but
instead works for a company on the other side of the
country. Then the robot has to request information
from two separate agents, one to query the manager
and technician and one to query the programmer. As-
sume that the agents and the robot all rank the sources
the same, assigning the technician rank 2 and the other
two agents rank 1, which induces the same credibility
ordering used in Example 5. The agents’ pedigreed be-
lief states and the result of their fusion are shown in
Figure 5.
2
FD
FD
FD
A2
FD
1
1
1
1
1
1
FD
FD
FD
F
FD
1A 1A A2
FD
1
1
2 2
1
FD
2
2
1 2
Figure 5: The pedigreed belief states of agent A1 in-
formed by sm and st and of agent A2 informed by sp,
and the result of their fusion in Example 8.
The first agent does not provide any information about
overloading and the second agent provides incorrect in-
formation. However, we see that after fusing the two,
the robot has a belief state that is identical to what it
computed in Example 5 when there was only one agent
informed by all three sources (we’ve only separated the
top set of worlds so as to show the labeling). Conse-
quently, it now knows the correct state of the system.
And, satisfyingly, the final result does not depend on
the order in which the robot receives the agents’ re-
ports.
The savings obtained in required storage space by
this scheme can be substantial. Whereas explicitly
storing all of an agent’s informant sources S requires
O(‖S‖2W) amount of space in the worst case (when
all the sources’ belief states are fully connected rela-
tions), storing a pedigreed belief state only requires
O(2W) space in the worst case. Moreover, not only
does the enriched representation allow us to conserve
space, but it also provides for potential savings in the
efficiency of computing fusion since, for each pair of
worlds, we only need to consider the opinions of the
agents rather than those of all the sources in the com-
bined set of informants.
Incidentally, if we had used AGR∗ as the basis for
our general aggregation, simply storing the rank of the
maximum supporting sources would not give us suffi-
cient information to compute the induced belief state
after fusion. To demonstrate this, we give an example
where two pairs of sources induce the same annotated
agent belief states, yet yield different belief states after
fusion:
Example 9 Let W, S, and ⊒ be as in Exam-
ple 4. Suppose agents A1, A2, A
′
1, and A
′
2
are informed by sets of sources S1, S2, S
′
1, and
S′2, respectively, where S1 = S2 = {s2}, S
′
1 = {s0, s2},
and S′2 = {s1, s2}. AGR
∗ dictates that the pedi-
greed belief states of all four agents equal <s2 with
all opinions annotated with rank(s2). In spite
of this indistinguishability, if A =©∨ ({A1, A2}) and
A′ =©∨ ({A′1, A
′
2}), then A’s induced belief state
equals <s2 , i.e., {(a, b), (c, b)}, whereas A′’s is
{(a, b), (c, b), (a, c), (c, a), (a, a), (b, b), (c, c)}.
7 Conclusion
We have described a semantically clean representa-
tion for aggregate beliefs which allows us to represent
conflicting opinions without sacrificing the ability to
make decisions. We have proposed an intuitive oper-
ator which takes advantage of this representation so
that an agent can combine the belief states of a set
of informant sources totally pre-ordered by credibility.
Finally, we have described a mechanism for fusing the
belief states of different agents which iterates well.
The aggregation methods we have discussed here are
just special cases of a more general framework based on
voting. That is, we account not only for the ranking of
the sources supporting or disagreeing with an opinion
(i.e., the quality of support), but also the percentage of
sources in each camp (the quantity of support). Such
an extension allows for a much more refined approach
to aggregation, one much closer to what humans of-
ten use in practice. Exploring this richer space is the
subject of further research.
Another problem which deserves further study is de-
veloping a fuller understanding of the properties of the
Bel, Agn, and Con operators and how they interrelate.
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A Proofs
Proposition 1
1. The transitive closure of a modular relation is
modular.
2. Every transitive relation is quasi-transitive.
3. (Sen 1986) Every quasi-transitive relation is
acyclic.
Proof:
1. Suppose a relation ≤ over finite set Ω is modu-
lar, and ≤+ is the transitive closure of ≤. Sup-
pose x, y, z ∈ Ω and x ≤+ y. Then there ex-
ist w0, . . . , wn such that x = w0 ≤ · · · ≤ wn = y.
Since ≤ is modular and w0 ≤ w1, either w0 ≤ z
or z ≤ w1. In the former case, x = w0 ≤ z, so
x ≤+ z. In the latter case, z ≤ w1 ≤ · · ·wn = y,
so z ≤+ y.
2. Suppose Ω is a finite set, x, y, z ∈ Ω, ≤ is a tran-
sitive relation over Ω, and < is its strict version.
Suppose x < y and y < z. Then x ≤ y, y 6≤ x,
y ≤ z, and z 6≤ y. x ≤ y and y ≤ z imply x ≤ z,
and y ≤ z and y 6≤ x imply z 6≤ x, both by tran-
sitivity. So x < z.
Proposition 2 (Sen 1986) Given a relation ≤ over a
finite set Ω, the choice set operation C defines a choice
function iff ≤ is acyclic.
Proof: See (Sen 1986).
Proposition 3 (Arrow 1963) There is no aggregation
operator that satisfies restricted range, unrestricted do-
main, (weak) Pareto principle, independendence of ir-
relevant alternatives, and nondictatorship.
Proof: See (Arrow 1963).
Proposition 4 Let  be a relation over a finite set
Ω and let ∼ be its symmetric restriction (i.e., x ∼ y
iff x  y and y  x). If  is total and quasi-transitive
but not transitive, then ∼ is not transitive.
Proof: Let  be a total, quasi-transitive, non-
transitive relation. First, such a relation exits: if
Ω = {a, b, c}, it is easily verified that the relation
Ω× Ω \ {(b, a)} is total, quasi-transitive, but not tran-
sitive.
Suppose x  y and y  z but x 6 z. By totality,
z  x, so z ≺ x. If x ≺ y, then z ≺ y by quasi-
transitivity, a contradiction. Thus, x ∼ y. Similarly,
if y ≺ z, then y ≺ x, a contradiction, so y ∼ z. But
z ≺ x, so x 6∼ z. Therefore, ∼ is not transitive.
Proposition 5 Suppose a relation ≺ is transitive and
∼ is the corresponding agnosticism relation. Then ∼
is transitive iff ≺ is modular.
Proof: Suppose ∼ is transitive and suppose x ≺ z,
x, y, z ∈ W. We prove by contradiction: Suppose
x 6≺ y and y 6≺ z. By transitivity, z 6≺ y and y 6≺ x,
so x ∼ y and y ∼ z. By assumption, x ∼ z, so x 6≺ z,
a contradiction.
Suppose, instead, ≺ is modular and suppose x ∼ y
and y ∼ z, x, y, z ∈ W . Then x 6≺ y, y 6≺ x, y 6≺ z, and
z 6≺ y. By modularity, x 6≺ z and z 6≺ x, so x ∼ z.
Proposition 6 The set of irreflexive relations in B is
isomorphic to T and, in fact, equals T<.
Proof: Let x, y, z ∈ W . Suppose ≺∈ B is irreflexive.
Let  be defined as x  y iff y 6≺ x. We first show
that ≺ is the strict version of . Suppose ≺′ is the
strict version of . If x ≺′ y, then x  y and y 6 x,
so x ≺ y. If, instead, x ≺ y, then y 6 x. By totality,
x  y, so x ≺′ y.
We show that ∈ T . If x 6≺ y then y  x. Other-
wise, x ≺ y. But since ≺ is irreflexive, y 6≺ x (oth-
erwise x ≺ x by transitivity), so x  y and  is total.
Next, suppose x  y and y  z. Then y 6≺ x and z 6≺ y.
By modularity, z 6≺ x, so x  z, so  is transitive.
Now suppose∈ T and ≺ is its strict version. First we
show that ≺ is modular. Suppose x ≺ y. Then x  y
and y 6 x. Since  is total, x  z or z  x. Suppose
x  z. Whether y  z or y 6 z, z 6 x by transitivity.
Suppose, instead, z  x. Then z  y and y 6 z, both
by transitivity. We conclude that x  z and z 6 x, or
z  y and y 6 z, so x ≺ z or z ≺ y. Second, transitiv-
ity of ≺ follows immediately from Proposition 1 and
the transitivity of . Finally, ≺ is irreflexive since it
is asymmetric.
Proposition 7 ≺∈ B iff there is a partition
W = 〈W0, . . . ,Wn〉 of W such that:
1. For every x ∈Wi and y ∈Wj , i 6= j implies i < j
iff x ≺ y.
2. Every Wi is either fully connected (w ≺ w′ for all
w,w′ ∈Wi) or fully disconnected (w 6≺ w′ for all
w,w′ ∈Wi).
Proof: We refer to the conditions in the proposition
as conditions 1 and 2, respectively. We prove each
direction of the proposition separately.
(=⇒) Suppose ≺∈ B, that is, ≺ is a modular and tran-
sitive relation over W . We use a series of definitions
and lemmas to show that a partition ofW exists satis-
fying conditions 1 and 2. We first define an equivalence
relation by which we will partition W . Two elements
will be equivalent if they “look the same” from the
perspective of every element of W :
Definition 23 x ≡ y iff for every z ∈ W, x ≺ z iff
y ≺ z and z ≺ x iff z ≺ y.
Lemma 7.1 ≡ is an equivalence relation over W.
Proof: Suppose x ∈ W . For every z ∈ W , x ≺ z iff
x ≺ z and z ≺ x iff z ≺ x, so x ≡ x. Therefore, ≡ is
reflexive.
Suppose x, y ∈ W and x ≡ y. Then for every z ∈ W ,
x ≺ z iff y ≺ z and z ≺ x iff z ≺ y. But then for every
z ∈ W , y ≺ z iff x ≺ z and z ≺ y iff z ≺ x. Therefore,
y ≡ x, so ≡ is symmetric.
Suppose x, y, z ∈ W , x ≡ y, and y ≡ z. Suppose fur-
ther that w ∈ W . By definition of ≡, x ≺ w iff y ≺ w
and w ≺ x iff w ≺ y, and y ≺ w iff z ≺ w and w ≺ y
iff w ≺ z. Therefore, x ≺ w iff z ≺ w and w ≺ x iff
w ≺ z. Since w is arbitrary, x ≡ z, so ≡ is transitive.
≡ partitionsW into its equivalence classes. We use [w]
to denote the equivalence class containing w, that is,
the set {w′ ∈ W : w ≡ w′}. Observe that two worlds
in conflict always appear in the same equivalence class:
Lemma 7.2 If x, y ∈ W and x∞y, then [x] = [y].
Proof: Suppose x, y ∈ W and x∞y. Since [x] is an
equivalence class, it suffices to show that y ∈ [x], that
is, x ≡ y. Suppose z ∈ W . By transitivity, if x ≺ z,
then y ≺ z; if y ≺ z, then x ≺ z; if z ≺ x, then z ≺ y;
and, if z ≺ y then z ≺ x. Thus, x ≺ z iff y ≺ z and
z ≺ x iff z ≺ y, and since z is arbitrary, x ≡ y.
We now define a total order over these equivalence
classes:
Definition 24 For all x, y ∈ W, [x] ≤ [y] iff [x] = [y]
or x ≺ y.
Lemma 7.3 ≤ is well-defined, that is, if x ≡ x′ and
y ≡ y′, then x ≺ y iff x′ ≺ y′, for all x, x′, y, y′ ∈ W.
Proof: Suppose x ≡ x′ and y ≡ y′, x, x′, y, y′ ∈ W .
By the definition of ≡, for every z ∈ W , x ≺ z iff
x′ ≺ z. In particular, x ≺ y iff x′ ≺ y. Also by the
definition of ≡, for every z′ ∈ W , z′ ≺ y iff z′ ≺ y′.
In particular, x′ ≺ y iff x′ ≺ y′. Therefore, x ≺ y iff
x′ ≺ y′.
Lemma 7.4 ≤ is a total order over the equivalence
classes of W defined by ≡.
Proof: Suppose x, y, z ∈ W . We first show that ≤
is total. By definition of ≤, if x ≺ y or y ≺ x, then
[x] ≤ [y] or [y] ≤ [x], respectively. Suppose x 6≺ y and
y 6≺ x, and suppose z ∈ W . By modularity of ≺,
x ≺ z implies y ≺ z, y ≺ z implies x ≺ z, z ≺ x implies
z ≺ y, and z ≺ y implies z ≺ x, so x ≡ y. Therefore,
[x] = [y], so [x] ≤ [y] by the definition of ≤.
Next, we show that ≤ is anti-symmetric. Suppose
[x] ≤ [y] and [y] ≤ [x]. Then [x] = [y] or x ≺ y and
y ≺ x. In the former case we are done, in the latter,
the result follows from Lemma 7.2.
Finally, we show that ≤ is transitive. Suppose [x] ≤ [y]
and [y] ≤ [z]. Obviously, if [x] = [y] or [y] = [x], then
[x] ≤ [z]. Suppose not. Then x ≺ y and y ≺ z, so
x ≺ z by the transitivity of ≺. Therefore, [x] ≤ [y]
by the definition of ≤.
We name the members of the partition W0, . . . ,Wn
such that Wi ≤Wj iff i ≤ j, where n is an integer.
Such a naming exists since every finite, totally ordered
set is isomorphic to some finite prefix of the integers.
We now check that this partition satisfies the two
conditions. For the first condition, suppose x ∈ Wi,
y ∈Wj , and i 6= j. We want to show that i < j iff
x ≺ y. Since i 6= j, [x] 6= [y]. Suppose i < j. Then
i ≤ j, so [x] ≤ [y]. Since [x] 6= [y], x ≺ y by the def-
inition of ≤. Now suppose, instead, that x ≺ y.
Then [x] ≤ [y] by the definition of ≤, so i ≤ j. Since
[x] 6= [y], y 6≺ x by Lemma 7.2. Since [x] 6= [y] and
y 6≡ x, [x] 6≤ [y] by the definition of ≤, so j 6≤ i. Thus,
i < j.
Finally, we show that eachWi is either fully connected
or fully disconnected. Suppose x, y, z ∈Wi so that
x ≡ y ≡ z. It suffices to show that x ≺ x iff y ≺ z. By
the definition of≡, x ≺ x iff y ≺ x, and x ≺ x iff x ≺ z.
Suppose x ≺ x. Then, y ≺ x and x ≺ z, so y ≺ z by
transitivity of ≺. Suppose now, x 6≺ x. Then, y 6≺ x
and x 6≺ z, so y 6≺ z by modularity of ≺.
(⇐=) Suppose W = 〈W0, . . . ,Wn〉 is a partition of W
and ≺ is a relation over W satisfying the given condi-
tions. We want to show that ≺ is modular and tran-
sitive. We first give the following lemma:
Lemma 7.5 Suppose W is a partition of W and
≺ is a relation over W satisfying condition 1. If
Wi,Wj ∈W, x ∈Wi, y ∈Wj , and x ≺ y, then i ≤ j.
Proof: If i = j, we’re done. Suppose i 6= j. Then,
since x ≺ y, i < j by condition 1.
We now show ≺ is modular. Suppose x ∈Wi, y ∈ Wj ,
and x ≺ y. Then i ≤ j by Lemma 7.5. Suppose
z ∈ Wk. Then i ≤ k or k ≤ j by the modularity of ≤.
Suppose i < k or k < j. Then x ≺ z or z ≺ y by con-
dition 1. Otherwise i = k = j, so x, y, z ∈Wi. Since
x ≺ y, Wi is fully connected by condition 2, so x ≺ z
(and z ≺ y).
Finally, we show that ≺ is transitive. Suppose x ∈ Wi,
y ∈Wj , z ∈Wk, x ≺ y, and y ≺ z. By Lemma 7.5,
i ≤ j and j ≤ k, so i ≤ k by the transitivity of ≤.
Suppose i < k. Then x ≺ z by condition 1. Other-
wise i = k = j, so x, y, z ∈Wi. Since x ≺ y,Wi is fully
connected by condition 2, so x ≺ z.
(END OF PROPOSITION 7 PROOF)
Proposition 8 T ⊂ B and is the set of reflexive rela-
tions in B.
Proof: We first show that T ⊂ B. Let ∈ T and
x, y, z ∈ W. By definition,  is transitive. Suppose
x  y. Since  is total, x  z or z  x. If z  x,
then z  y by transitivity, so  is modular. On the
other hand, the empty relation overW is modular and
transitive, but not total and, consequently, not in T .
Now we show that ≺∈ B is in T if and only if it is
reflexive. If ≺∈ T , it is total, so it is reflexive. If,
instead, ≺ is reflexive, then x ≺ x so, by modularity,
x ≺ y or y ≺ x. Thus, ≺ is total. And, since ≺∈ B, it
is transitive.
Proposition 9
1. Q∩ B = T .
2. B 6⊆ Q.
3. Q 6⊆ B if W has at least three elements.
4. Q ⊂ B if W has one or two elements.
Proof:
1. Suppose∈ Q ∩ B. Then is total and transitive
and, hence, in T . Suppose ∈ T . By definition,
 is total. Also by definition, it is transitive, so
by Proposition 1, it is quasi-transitive and, thus,
in Q. By Proposition 8, ∈ B and, so, in Q∩ B.
2. The empty relation is modular and transitive, but
not total and, so, not in Q.
3. Suppose a and b are distinct elements of W . The
relation W ×W \ {(b, a)} is total, and, since the
strict version is {(a, b)} which is transitive, it is
also quasi-transitive. However, if there are at least
three elements in W , it is not transitive and, so,
not in B.
4. Suppose W has one element. Then B contains
both possible relations over W , whereas Q con-
tains only the fully connected relation over W .
Suppose W has two elements a and b. Then B
contains empty relation, the fully connected rela-
tion, and all the remaining eight relations which
contain either (a, b) or (b, a), but not both. Q, on
the other hand, only contains the three reflexive
relations containing either (a, b) or (b, a).
Proposition 10
1. Q< ∩ B = T<.
2. B 6⊆ Q<.
3. Q< 6⊆ B if W has at least three elements.
4. Q< ⊂ B if W has one or two elements.
Proof:
1. Suppose ≺∈ Q< ∩ B. Since ≺∈ Q<, it is irreflex-
ive, so since it is in B, it is in T< by Proposi-
tion 6. Suppose, instead, ≺∈ T<. By Proposi-
tion 6, ≺∈ B. Let ∈ T be a relation such that
≺ is its strict version. (Obviously such a rela-
tion must exist.) From Proposition 9, ∈ Q, so
≺∈ Q<. Thus, ≺∈ Q< ∩ B.
2. The fully connected relation over W is in B, but
not asymmetric and, so, not in Q<.
3. Suppose a and b are distinct elements ofW . IfW
has at least three elements, the relation {(a, b)} is
not modular and, thus, not in B, yet it is the strict
version of the relation W ×W \ {(b, a)} which is
total and quasi-transitive (since {(a, b)} is transi-
tive).
4. Suppose W has one element. Then B contains
both possible relations over W , whereas Q< con-
tains only the empty relation over W .
SupposeW has two elements a and b. Then B con-
tains empty relation, the fully connected relation,
and all eight of the remaining relations which con-
tain either (a, b) or (b, a), but not both. Q<, on
the other hand, only contains the three irreflexive
relations.
Proposition 11 If S ⊆ S, then Un(S) is modular but
not necessarily transitive.
Proof: Let ≺= Un(S). Suppose x, y, z ∈ W and
x ≺ y. Then there is some s ∈ S such that x <s y.
By assumption, <s is modular, so x <s z or z <s y.
By the definition of Un(S), x ≺ z or z ≺ y, so ≺ is
modular.
Suppose a, b, c ∈ W and S = {s1, s2} such that
<s1= {(a, b), (a, c)} and <s2= {(b, a), (c, a)}. Un(S)
is not transitive.
Proposition 12 If S ⊆ S, then AGRUn(S) ∈ B.
Proof: The transitive closure of any relation is tran-
sitive. Since Un(S) is modular, the transitive closure
of Un(S) is also modular by Proposition 1.
Proposition 13 If S ⊆ S and ⊒S is a total order,
then AGRRf(S) ∈ B.
Proof: We first prove that AGRRf(S) is modular.
Note that the proof does not depend on ⊒S being a
total order.
Lemma 13.1 If S ⊆ S, then AGRRf(S) is modular.
Proof: Let ≺= AGRRf(S). Suppose x, y, z ∈ W
and x ≺ y. Then there exists s ∈ S such that x <s y
and, for every s′ ∈ S, s′ ❂ s implies x 6<s
′
y and
y 6<s
′
x. Consider a source s′ such that x <s
′
z,
z <s
′
x, y <s
′
z, or z <s
′
y and, for every s′′ ∈ S,
s′′ ❂ s′ implies x 6<s
′′
z, z 6<s
′′
x, y 6<s
′′
z, and z 6<s
′′
y.
We know such a source exists since, by modularity,
x <s z or z <s y. Furthermore, since s′ is a maximal
rank such source, s′ ⊒ s. We consider the four cases
and show that, in each, either x ≺ z or z ≺ y:
Case 1: x <s
′
z. Since, for every s′′ ∈ S, s′′ ❂ s′ im-
plies x 6<s
′′
z and z 6<s
′′
x, x ≺ z.
Case 2: z <s
′
x. By modularity, z <s
′
y or y <s
′
x.
Suppose z <s
′
y. Since, for every s′′ ∈ S, s′′ ❂ s′ im-
plies z 6<s
′′
y and y 6<s
′′
z, z ≺ y.
Suppose y <s
′
x. Then s ⊒ s′, so s ≡ s′. Since x <s y,
x <s z or z <s y by modularity. Thus, substituting
s for s′ above, either x <s z and, for every s′′ ∈ S,
s′′ ❂ s implies x 6<s
′′
z and z 6<s
′′
x so that x ≺ z, or
z <s y and, for every s′′ ∈ S, s′′ ❂ s implies z 6<s
′′
y
and y 6<s
′′
z so that z ≺ y.
Case 3: y <s
′
z. By modularity, y <s
′
x or x <s
′
z
which we have already considered in cases 2 and 1,
respectively.
Case 4: z <s
′
y. We have already considered this in
case 2.
It remains to show that ≺ is transitive. Suppose x ≺ y
and y ≺ z. Then there exists s1 ∈ S such that x <s1 y
and, for every s′1 ∈ S, s
′
1 ❂ s implies x 6<
s′
1 y and
y 6<s
′
1 x, and there exists s2 ∈ S such that y <
s2 z and,
for every s′2 ∈ S, s
′
2 ❂ s implies y 6<
s′
2 z and z 6<s
′
2 y.
Suppose s1 ❂ s2 (the case s2 ❂ s1 is similar). Then
y 6<s1 z and z 6<s1 y. By modularity, since x <s1 y and
z 6<s1 y, x <s1 z. Let s′ ∈ S and s′ ❂ s1. Then x 6<s
′
y
and y 6<s
′
x. And, since s1 ❂ s2, s
′
❂ s2, so y 6<s
′
z
and z 6<s
′
y. By modularity, x 6<s
′
z and z 6<s
′
x.
Therefore, x ≺ z.
Proposition 14 If S ⊆ S, then AGR∗(S) ∈ B.
Proof: By Proposition 12, ≺r∈ B for every
r ∈ ranks(S). For convenience, we assume the ex-
istence of a “virtual” source sr corresponding to
each ≺r. Precisely, for each r ∈ ranks(S), assume
there exists a source sr ∈ S such that <sr=≺r and
rank(sr) = r, and let S
′ be the set of these sources.
Then,
AGR∗(S)
=
{
(x, y) :
∃r ∈ R. x <r y∧
(∀r′ > r ∈ ranks(S). x ≈r′ y)
}
=
{
(x, y) :
∃s ∈ S′. x <s y∧(
∀s′ ❂ s ∈ S′. x ≈s
′
y
) }
= AGRRf(S′).
Since there is one source in S′ per rank r, and since
> is a total order over R, ⊒S′ is a total order. The
result follows from Proposition 13.
Proposition 15 If S ⊆ S, then AGR(S) ∈ B.
Proof: By Lemma 13.1, AGRRf(S) is modular.
AGRRf(S)+ is obviously transitive, and, by Propo-
sition 1, it is modular as well.
Proposition 16 Suppose S ⊆ S.
1. If ⊒S is fully connected, AGR(S) = AGRUn(S).
2. If ⊒S is a total order, AGR(S) = AGRRf(S).
Proof:
1. Suppose ⊒S is fully connected. Then the
second half of the definition of AGRRf
is vacuously true so that AGRRf(S) sim-
plifies to {(x, y) : ∃s ∈ S. x <s y}. But
this is exactly
⋃
s∈S <
s, i.e., Un(S), so
AGR(S) = AGRRf(S)+ = Un(S)+ = AGRUn(S).
2. Suppose ⊒S is an total order. By Propo-
sition 13, AGRRf(S) is transitive, so
AGR(S) = AGRRf(S)+ = AGRRf(S).
Proposition 17 Let S = {s1, . . . , sn} ⊆ S and
AGRf (<
s1 , . . . , <sn) = AGR(S). AGRf satisfies (the
modified versions of) restricted range, unrestricted
domain, Pareto principle, IIA, and non-dictatorship.
Proof: Let ≺= AGRf (<
s1 , . . . , <sn). Then
≺= AGR(S).
Restricted range: AGRf satisfies restricted range
by Proposition 15.
Unrestricted domain: AGRf satisfies unrestricted
domain by Definition 7.
Pareto principle: Suppose x <si y for all si. In par-
ticular, x <s y where s is a maximal rank source of S.
Since s is maximal, it is vacuously true that for every
s′ ❂ s ∈ S, x 6<s y and y 6<s
′
x. Therefore, x ≺ y, so
AGRf satisfies the Pareto principle.
IIA: Let S′ = {s′1, . . . , s
′
n}. First note that AGRRf
satisfies IIA:
Lemma 17.1 Suppose S = {s1, . . . , sn} ⊆ S,
S′ = {s′1, . . . , s
′
n} ⊆ S, si ≡ s
′
i for all i,
≺∗= AGRRf(S), and ≺′∗= AGRRf(S
′). If, for
x, y ∈ W, x <si y iff x <s
′
i y for all i, then x ≺∗ y iff
x ≺′∗ y.
Proof: Suppose si ≡ s′i, and x <
si y iff x <s
′
i y, for
all i. Then x ≺∗ y iff x ≺′∗ y since Definition 13 only
relies on the relative ranking of the sources and the
relations between x and y in their belief states to de-
termine the relation between x and y in the aggregated
state.
Thus, IIA can only be disobeyed when the closure step
of AGR introduces new opinions. (Note that IIA is
satisfied when there are no sources of equal rank since,
by Proposition 16, the closure step introduces no new
opinions under these conditions.) However, these new
opinions are only added between worlds already in-
volved in a conflict, as the following two lemmas show:
Lemma 17.2 Suppose S ⊆ S and ≺∗= AGRRf(S).
For every integer n ≥ 2, if x, y ∈ W, x 6≺∗ y, there ex-
ist x0, . . . , xn ∈ W such that x = x0 ≺∗ · · · ≺∗ xn = y,
and n is the smallest integer such that this is true, then
xn ≺∗ · · · ≺∗ x0.
Proof: Suppose x, y ∈ W , x 6≺∗ y, and there ex-
ist x0, . . . , xn ∈ W such that x = x0 ≺∗ · · · ≺∗ xn = y,
and n is the smallest integer such that this is true.
Consider any triple xi−1, xi, xi+1, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
First, xi−1 6≺∗ xi+1, otherwise there would be a chain
of shorter length than n between x and y. Now, since
xi−1 ≺∗ xi, there exists s1 ∈ S such that xi−1 <s1 xi
and, for all s′ ❂ s1 ∈ S, xi−1 ≈s
′
xi. Similarly,
there exists s2 ∈ S such that xi <
s2 xi+1 and, for all
s′ ❂ s2 ∈ S, xi ≈s
′
xi+1. Thus, all sources with higher
rank than max(s1, s2) are agnostic with respect to xi−1
and xi+1.
Suppose s1 ❂ s2. Then xi ≈s1 xi+1 so, by transitivity,
xi−1 <
s1 xi+1. But then xi−1 ≺∗ xi+1, a contradic-
tion. Similarly, we derive a contradiction if s2 ⊂ s1.
Thus, s1 ≡ s2.
Now, since xi−1 6≺∗ xi+1 and all sources with rank
higher than s1 and s2 are agnostic with respect to xi−1
and xi+1, xi−1 6<s1 xi+1. By modularity, xi+1 <s1 xi.
Since s1 ≡ s2, and all the sources with higher rank
than s2 are agnostic with respect to xi and xi+1,
xi+1 ≺∗ xi. Similarly, xi <s2 xi−1, so xi ≺∗ xi−1.
Since i was chosen arbitrarily between 1 and n− 1,
xn ≺∗ · · · ≺∗ x0. And, in fact, all the opinions be-
tween these worlds originate from sources of the same
rank.
Lemma 17.3 Suppose S ⊆ S, ≺∗= AGRRf(S),
≺= AGR(S), and x 6≺∗ y for x, y ∈ W. If x ≺ y, then
x∞y.
Proof: Suppose x 6≺∗ y. If x ≺ y, then there exist
x0, . . . , xn such that x = x0 ≺∗ · · · ≺∗ xn = y and n is
the smallest positive integer such that this is true.
Then, by Lemma 17.2, y = xn ≺∗ · · · ≺∗ x0 = x, so
y ≺ x and x∞y.
Now, suppose x, y ∈ W , x <si y iff x <s
′
i y for all i,
x6∞y, and x6∞′y. We show that x ≺ y implies x ≺′ y
(the other direction is identical). Suppose x ≺ y.
Let ≺∗= AGRRf(S) and ≺′∗= AGRRf(S
′). Since
x6∞y, x ≺∗ y by Lemma 17.3. But then x ≺′∗ y by
Lemma 17.1, so x ≺′ y.
(END OF IIA SUB-PROOF)
Non-dictatorship: Suppose ⊒S is fully connected
and suppose x <si y and y 6<si x. Let sj be such that
y <sj x. Then x ≺ y and y ≺ x, so si is not a dictator.
(END OF PROPOSITION 17 PROOF)
Proposition 18 Let A and S be as in Definition 21,
≺Ai , agent Ai’s induced belief state, and ⊒S, fully con-
nected. If A =©∨ (A), then
(⋃
Ai∈A
≺Ai
)+
is A’s in-
duced belief state.
Proof: We will use the following lemma:
Lemma 18.1 If Π is a set of relations over an arbi-
trary finite set Ω, then
 ⋃
≤∈Π
≤+


+
=

 ⋃
≤∈Π
≤


+
where ≤+ is the transitive closure of ≤.
Proof: Let ≺=
(⋃
≤∈Π ≤
+
)+
, ≺′=
(⋃
≤∈Π ≤
)+
,
and a, b ∈ Ω. Suppose a ≺ b. Then there exist
≤0, . . . ,≤n−1∈ Π and w0, . . . , wn ∈ Ω such that
a = w0 ≤
+
0 · · · ≤
+
n−1 wn = b
Thus, there exist x00, . . . , x0m0 , . . .,
x(n−1)0, . . . , x(n−1)mn−1 in Ω such that
a = w0 = x00 ≤0 · · · ≤0 x0m0 = w1 = x10 · · ·
= wn−1 = x(n−1)0 ≤n−1 · · · ≤n−1 x(n−1)mn−1
= wn = b
so a ≤′ b.
Now suppose a ≺′ b. Then there exist
≤0, . . . ,≤n−1∈ Π and w0, . . . , wn ∈ Ω such that
a = w0 ≤0 · · · ≤n−1 wn = b
Obviously, this implies that
a = w0 ≤
+
0 · · · ≤
+
n−1 wn = b
which implies that
a = w0 ≤
+
∗ · · · ≤
+
∗ wn = b
where ≤∗=
(⋃
≤∈Π ≤
)
, so a ≤ b.
Now, let ≺ be the belief state induced by©∨ (A). Then
≺= AGR(S). By Proposition 16, ≺= AGRUn(S), so
≺ = Un(S)+
=
(⋃
s∈S
<s
)+
=

 ⋃
s∈
⋃
n
i=1
Si
<s


+
=
( ⋃
Ai∈A
⋃
s∈Si
<s
)+
By the lemma,
≺ =

 ⋃
Ai∈A
( ⋃
s∈Si
<s
)+
+
=
( ⋃
Ai∈A
AGRUn(Si)
)+
=
( ⋃
Ai∈A
≺Ai
)+
Proposition 19 Let A be an agent informed by a set
of sources S ⊆ S and with pedigreed belief state (≺, l).
Then
x ≺Ar y
iff
∃s ∈ S. x <s y ∧ r = rank(s)∧(
∀s′ ❂ s ∈ S. x ≈s
′
y
)
.
Proof: Suppose x ≺Ar y. Then x ≺ y and
l((x, y)) = r. By Definitions 13 and 22, there
exists s ∈ S such that x <s y and for every s′ ❂ s ∈ S,
x ≈s
′
y. In particular, if x <s
′
y for some s′ ∈ S, then
s ❂ s′, so rank(s) ≥ rank(s′). Thus,
r = l((x, y))
= max{rank(s′) : x <s
′
y, s′ ∈ S}
= rank(s).
Now suppose there exists s ∈ S such that x <s y,
r = rank(s), and, for every s′ ❂ s ∈ S, x ≈s
′
y. Then
x ≺ y. Moreover, since for every s′ ∈ S, x <s
′
y im-
plies s ⊒ s′ which implies rank(s) ≥ rank(s′),
l((x, y)) = max{rank(s′) : x <s
′
y, s′ ∈ S}
= rank(s)
= r.
Therefore, x ≺Ar y.
Proposition 20 Let A and S be as in Definition 21,
⊒S, a total pre-order, and A =©∨ (A). If
1. ≺ is the relation{
(x, y) :
∃Ai ∈ A, r ∈ R. x ≺Air y∧(
∀Aj ∈ A, r′ > r ∈ R. x ∼
Aj
r′ y
) }
over W,
2. l :≺→ R such that
l((x, y)) = max{r : x ≺Air y,Ai ∈ A}, and
then (≺, l) is A’s pedigreed belief state.
Proof: Let ≺′= AGRRf(S) and l′ :≺′→R such
that l′((x, y)) = max{rank(s) : x <s y, s ∈ S}. It suf-
fices to show that ≺=≺′ and l = l′.
Suppose x ≺ y. We show that x ≺′ y, i.e., there ex-
ists s ∈ S such that x <s y and, for every s′ ❂ s ∈ S,
x 6<s
′
y and y 6<s
′
x, and that l′((x, y)) = l((x, y)).
Since x ≺ y, there exists Ai and r such that x ≺Air y
and, for every Aj ∈ A and r′ > r ∈ R, x 6≺
Aj
r′ y and
y 6≺
Aj
r′ x. Since x ≺
Ai
r y, there exists s ∈ Si such
that x <s y, rank(s) = r, and, for every s1 ❂ s ∈ Si,
x 6<s1 y and y 6<s1 x. Si ⊆ S, so there exists s ∈ S
such that x <s y. Now suppose s′ is a maximal rank
source of S with x <s
′
y or y <s
′
x. Such an s′ exists
since x <s y. Since ⊒ is a total pre-order, it suffices
to show that s ⊒ s′. Suppose s′ ∈ Sj . Since Sj ⊆ S,
s′ is also a maximal rank source of Sj with x <
s′ y
or y <s
′
x, so x ≺
Aj
rank(s′) y or y ≺
Aj
rank(s′) x. But since
x ≺Air y, r = rank(s) ≥ rank(s
′), so s ⊒ s′. Further-
more, l′((x, y)) = rank(s) = r = l((x, y)).
Now suppose x ≺′ y. We show that x ≺ y, i.e., there
exists Ai and r such that x ≺Air y and, for every
Aj ∈ A and r′ > r ∈ R, x 6≺
Aj
r′ y and y 6≺
Aj
r′ x, and
that l((x, y)) = l′((x, y)). Since x ≺′ y, there exists
s ∈ S such that x <s y and, for every s′ ❂ s ∈ S,
x 6<s
′
y and y 6<s
′
x. Suppose s ∈ Si. Since Si ⊆ S,
it is also the case that for every s′ ❂ s ∈ Si, x 6<s
′
y
and y 6<s
′
x, so x ≺Ai
rank(s) y. Now, let Aj and r
′ be
such that x ≺
Aj
r′ y or y ≺
Aj
r′ x. It suffices to show that
rank(s) ≥ r′. By Proposition 19, there exists s′ ∈ Sj
such that x <s
′
y or y <s
′
x and rank(s′) = r′. But
then s ⊒ s′, so rank(s) ≥ rank(s′) = r′. Furthermore,
l((x, y)) = rank(s) = l′((x, y)).
Proposition 21 If A and S are as in Definition 21,
⊒S is a total order, and (≺, l) is the pedigreed belief
state of ©∨ (A), then ≺+=≺.
Proof: Since ⊒S is a total order,
AGR(S) = AGRRf(S) by Proposition 16. Thus,
≺= AGRRf(S) = AGR(S) = AGRRf(S)+ =≺+.
B Notation key
Ω: arbitrary finite set
a, b, c, . . .: specific elements of a set
x, y, z, . . .: arbitrary elements of a set
A,B,C, . . .: specific subsets of a set
X,Y, Z, . . .: arbitrary subsets of a set
Π: arbitrary set of relations
≤: arbitrary relation
C(X,≤): choice set of W wrt ≤
W : finite set of possible worlds/alternatives
w, W : element, subset of W , respectively
B: set of generalized belief states (modular, transitive
relations)
≺: element of B, strict likelihood/preference
: weak likelihood/preference
∼: equal likelihood, agnosticism/indifference
∞: conflict
T : set of total pre-orders
T<: strict versions of total pre-orders
Q: set of total, quasi-transitive relations
Q<: strict versions of total, quasi-transitive relations
S: set of sources
s, S: element, subset of S, respectively
<s: belief state of source s
≈: source agnosticism
⊲⊳: source conflict
R: set of ranks
r: element of R
⊒, ⊒S: credibility ordering over S, S ⊆ S, respectively
A: set of agents
A: element of A
≺A: A’s induced belief state
(≺, l): pedigreed belief state
l: labeling function of a pedigreed belief state
≺Ar : restriction of A’s pedigreed belief state to rank r
